Recently published, Decision No. 2478/2026 of the Three-Member Court of Appeal of Athens rejected the appeal of the opposing party – a debt management company – and upheld Decision No. 36/2025 of the Multi-Member Court of First Instance of Athens, determining that a claim arising from a loan agreement executed between our clients and a credit institution in Japanese Yen and subject to English law was time-barred.
The decision is of particular legal interest because it held that the loan agreement in question, although not executed as a “deed” under English law (namely, a document possessing enhanced formal validity and bearing the company seal), nevertheless bore the signatures of the General Manager and the Director of Credit Operations. Consequently, the court found that this produced the same legal effect as if the agreement had been executed as a deed.
Accordingly, the court held that the twelve-year limitation period provided by Section 20 of the Limitation Act 1980 (a special limitation rule) was applicable, rather than the six-year limitation period applicable to simple contracts under the general limitation regime.
Nevertheless, the claim arising from the loan agreement was held to be time-barred, since the debt had already become due and payable in 2007, whereas the action was commenced in 2022, namely after the expiration of the applicable twelve-year limitation period.
Of particular significance is the court’s acceptance that English law does not recognize a mechanism for interruption of limitation comparable to that existing under Greek law. As the court expressly stated: “Unlike Greek law and the majority of continental legal systems, under English law it is generally not possible for a claimant to rely on the interruption of a limitation period as a consequence of filing a claim seeking the judicial enforcement of a contractual obligation, such as a loan claim.”
The court further observed: “English law does not recognize the concept of interruption of limitation. Instead, the parties are merely afforded the possibility of stopping the limitation clock and reaching a timely standstill agreement.”
Applying these principles, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument advanced by the debt servicing company that a previous action filed in 2012 had interrupted the limitation period pursuant to Articles 263 et seq. of the Greek Civil Code.
The court held that, since the loan agreement was governed by English law, the limitation issue had to be assessed exclusively under English law rather than Greek law. Consequently, the interruption of the limitation period through the filing of prior legal proceedings could not be accepted, given that English law contains no equivalent rule.
As a result, the court concluded that the claim had already become statute-barred and that the action was substantively unfounded. Accordingly, it dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the legal costs incurred by the respondents.
